The SEC enacted Rule 10b5-1 to deter insiders from trading with private information, yet also protect insiders' preplanned, non-information-based trades from litigation. Despite its requirement that insiders plan trades when not privately informed, the Rule appears to enable strategic trade. Participating insiders' sales systematically follow positive and precede negative firm performance, generating abnormal forward-looking returns larger than those earned by non-participating colleagues. The observed association does not appear to be explained by market transaction disclosure response, "predictable" reversion following positive performance, or general periodic price declines. There is evidence, however, that a substantive proportion of randomly drawn plan initiations are associated with pending adverse news disclosures. There is also evidence that early sales plan terminations are associated with pending positive performance shifts, reducing the likelihood that insiders' sales execute at low prices. Collectively, this suggests that, on average, trading within the Rule does not solely reflect uninformed diversification.
returns are not the result of omitted firm-, industry-, or market-level factors. There is no evidence of a negative market response to disclosure of 10b5-1 transaction filings with the SEC. There is no evidence of a "predictable" price reversion (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) following sustained price increases in either a large cross-section of non-sample firms or in the pre-10b5-1 returns history for the sample firms. There is also no evidence that results are driven by bear markets during the analysis window.
Collectively, results suggest that trade within Rule 10b5-1 does not reflect pure diversification and indicates that some insiders may avail themselves of unintended strategic loopholes. This strategic trade potential highlights the difficulty in designing regulation that mitigates insiders' information advantage when trading. 4 If limiting strategic trade is optimal, regulators and firms might consider enhancing monitoring of, or imposing constraints on 10b5-1 plan use. Results also suggest that participants' trade predicts future market performance. Outside investors, therefore, might consider 10b5-1 trade signals as a means to develop profitable trading strategies. Finally, results suggest a predictable relationship exists between regulation that lowers insiders' trade risk and their trade behavior. 5, 6 This paper proceeds as follows: Section I provides background information about SEC Rule 10b5-1. Section II presents the hypotheses. Section III presents the sample. Section IV presents results. And Section V concludes the paper and discusses future research ideas.
I. Rule 10b5-1
The SEC released Rule 10b5-1 in October 2000, in part to deter insiders from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information. The Rule specifically makes trading while in possession 4 There is some evidence that regulation limits insiders' profitable trade opportunities. Insiders appear reluctant to trade profitably before forthcoming news events (Givoly and Palmon, 1985) ; earnings announcements (Park, Jang, and Loeb, 1995) , and management earnings forecasts (Penman, 1982; Noe, 1999) , and insiders also appear to reduce profitable trade before takeover announcements (Seyhun, 1992) and before negative earnings surprises (Garfinkel, 1997) in response to regulation and case law that increases penalties for illegal insider trading. 5 Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1992) do not find evidence that regulation that increases insider trading enforcement and penalties had a decreasing effect on insider trading volume and profitability. So there is some ex ante ambiguity regarding the association between regulatory litigation risk and insiders' trade behavior. 6 Reported results derive from a sample of voluntarily disclosed Rule 10b5-1 participants. It is not clear how these results generalize to 10b5-1 trade behavior at nondisclosure firms, since strategic trade may be correlated with disclosure choice. Firm-level choices (such as decisions to enact or disclose 10b5-1 plans) should not influence within-sample reported results, however, since potential firm-level choice bias is differenced away with a within-firm matched pair research design.
of material nonpublic information illegal across all jurisdictions. Prior to the Rule, the SEC enforced this possession standard but some courts instead enforced a use standard. 7 The SEC enacted the Rule to effectively eliminate the use standard because it is "highly doubtful that a person who knows inside information relevant to the value of a security can completely disregard that knowledge when making the decision to purchase or sell that security. …Indeed, even if the trader could put forth purported reasons for trading other than awareness of the inside information, other traders in the marketplace would clearly perceive him or her to possess an unfair advantage." 8 The SEC implemented relief within the Rule, recognizing that the possession standard limits insiders' ability to trade for diversification. The Rule provides an affirmative defense against litigation to insiders who preplan trades when they do not possess material nonpublic information. This safe harbor does not prevent a party from initiating a lawsuit against insiders, but it does provide insiders a defense "which, if found to be credible, will negate criminal or civil liability, even if it is proven that the defendant committed the alleged acts." 9, 10 To qualify for the affirmative defense, insiders must: (1) enter into an explicit contract to purchase or sell firm securities; (2) transfer trade execution authority to an uninformed third party (for example, a broker); or (3) provide an uninformed broker an explicit written algorithm for trade execution. Within these constraints, the Rule provides considerable plan structure flexibility regarding, for example, plan time length, trade volume, trade execution dates, and the use of market or limit orders. There are, Cir. 1998 ) supported the use standard. For trading to be deemed illegal, these courts required proof that an insider actually used material nonpublic information in his possession as a basis for his decision to trade. The use standard thereby allowed an insider in these jurisdictions to avoid legal jeopardy by credibly demonstrating that possession of nonpublic information did not influence his decision to trade. Usually, this argument requires the insider to demonstrate some tangible need for the proceeds from the equity transaction (for example, a house purchase). therefore, numerous plan permutations available to insiders, ignoring further firm-or plan administrator-imposed restrictions. Appendix A provides one plan structure example.
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Insiders may find trading within the Rule costly because the Rule limits their ability to influence trades after plans have been initiated. The Rule expressly prohibits insiders' subsequent influence over whether specific planned trades may execute. Insiders may, however, selectively terminate their plans before they are scheduled to expire or selectively execute additional trades outside of their plans. These selective acts may compromise the Rule's legal protection or trigger a negative market response. The SEC suggests that "termination of a plan…could affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions if it calls into question whether the plan was 'entered into in good faith. '" 12 A roundtable of corporate attorneys suggests that trading outside of an existing plan, particularly to hedge or negate positions within the plan, will likely jeopardize the plan's legal protection. 13 And there is anecdotal evidence that the market reacts negatively to a failure to comply with a preannounced trade commitment.
14 Some 10b5-1 use is not observable since the SEC allows firms to choose who participates within the Rule and whether participation is disclosed. 15 The SEC tabled a proposal, initiated in April 2002, to mandate 8-K (and possibly Form 4) disclosure of insiders' enrollment in 10b5-1 trading plans. 16 Some firms, however, choose to voluntarily disclose participation in 10b5-1 plans, which provides the opportunity to identify the sample for this study.
II. Hypotheses
11 The example shown in Appendix A may not represent a "typical" plan since it is voluntarily disclosed. Plan details are rarely disclosed. Therefore, the few publicly disclosed plans are perhaps the least likely to reflect strategic trade since disclosure commits insiders to their plans and enhances monitoring. It is not possible to directly observe the relationship between insiders' trades and insiders' nonpublic information, so one must draw inferences regarding this relationship from ex post realizations of trade returns (e.g., Jaffe, 1974) and the timing of trades relative to material information disclosure events (e.g., Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Seyhun, 1992; Seyhun and Bradley, 1997; Noe, 1999) .
Abnormal Returns
One should not observe abnormal trade returns if participants comply with the Rule's proscription that trades be planned absent private information. 17 The strength of the Rule's legal defense relies on the notion that insiders will, in good faith, not plan trade when they possess material nonpublic information. In fact, for the legal defense to hold, the burden of proof rests with insiders to show they have complied with the Rule. 18 Therefore, it is possible that there is no association between participants' trades and abnormal returns.
On the other hand, one might observe abnormal trade returns if some elements of the Rule allow participants to trade strategically. This is possible if (1) 
Trade Strategies
There are several trade strategies that might allow 10b5-1 participants to generate positive abnormal returns. 25 Participants, for example, might plan trade in anticipation of pending firm news events if they assess a lower probability that outsiders will discern possession of information at plan initiation.
Participants might also modify the timing or content of news announcements to increase returns on previously planned trades. In these cases, one should observe greater sales trade preceding negative firm events and greater purchase trade preceding positive firm events. 26 In addition, if insiders plan 20 Firms' use of the Rule as a substitute for blackout windows was confirmed through discussion with several firms' corporate attorneys and a review of several firms' publicly disclosed insider trading policies. 21 See Jeng (1999); Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) ; and Roulstone (2003) for discussion about firm-imposed blackout windows. 22 Rule 101(c) of Regulation BTR, 17 CFR 245.101(c) . 23 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show evidence that firms strategically modify news disclosure timing to lower employee option grant exercise prices. 24 The SEC explicitly states that the act of terminating a plan while aware of material nonpublic information does not result in liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because these regulations strictly apply in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Therefore, a purchase or sale of a security must be present for liability to attach. 
III. Sample
Rule 10b5-1 participants are identified from voluntary disclosure in SEC Form 4 and 8-K filings and in business press newswire releases. and 8-K or business wire disclosure. Therefore, the sample size is increased by appending insider and firm observations from firms that disclosed participation through means other than Form 4.
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Since the sample is drawn from firms that voluntarily disclose 10b5-1 participation, some inference issues arise. Specifically, there may be systematic differences between firms that voluntarily disclose 10b5-1 participation and firms that do not (in governance characteristics, for example), that may impact how participants trade within their plans. 28 Therefore, it is not clear whether results of this study can be generalized beyond the observed sample. Within-sample inference problems that might arise from firm-level selection bias, however, are mitigated through a within-firm research design. Table 1 Table 1 shows that disclosure firms are smaller (lower assets, sales, and market value of equity), on average, than firms in the S&P 500 index, yet are larger than those listed on the Nasdaq exchange. Most disclosure firms are listed on Nasdaq (59.2%), and the 27 Specifically, all open-market transactions (from Thomson Financial Insider Trading database) that occur within the 350-calendar-day window subsequent to an 8-K or business wire disclosure of 10b5-1 plan commencement are appended. This assumes that all transactions during this window, which reflects the average disclosed trading plan length (Table 1 , Panel D), are pursuant to the insiders' 10b5-1 plan. Results are similar when analyses are estimated solely on the Form 4 disclosure sample. 28 Some firms choose to not allow 10b5-1 participation because they govern insider trades through alternative means (Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor, 2008) or because they are uncertain about the validity of the affirmative defense (phone conversation anecdote). Some firms also choose not to disclose details of insiders' 10b5-1 participation because of concerns regarding investor response (phone conversation anecdote). Sixty-eight of 378 Nasdaq-listed survey respondents chose to not disclose insider 10b5-1 participation between October 20, 2000 and December 31, 2002, suggesting that nondisclosed participation is substantive.
New York Stock Exchange (35.0%). Some disclosure firms are ranked in the Fortune 500 (12.1%) or are included in the S&P 500 (13.6%). Rule 10b5-1 use is distributed across virtually all industry classifications with modest clustering in industries that Rogers and Stocken (2005) show to have greater general levels of litigation risk (e.g., biotechnology and electronics).
Panel C of Table 1 shows that most 10b5-1 participants are top-level managers. There is some lower-level management representation within this group (for example, Corporate Secretary), so the Rule does not appear to be exclusively available to top management.
Panel C and Panel D of Table 1 show that 10b5-1 trades are predominantly sales. This is consistent with insiders using the Rule to protect sales since insiders' sales are subject to greater litigation risk relative to insiders' purchases. 29 Specifically, the average total dollar volume of sales is almost seventeen times that of purchases during the period. There are also approximately 29 sellers for every one purchaser.
IV. Empirical Results

Abnormal Returns
Figure 1, Panels A and B provide graphs of the average cumulative market adjusted return preceding and following the sample 10b5-1 sales and purchase insider trade days. Daily market adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the value-weighted CRSP portfolio return from the firm's raw return. 30 Both Panels show a discernable kink in the returns pattern, centered on the trade execution date. These returns patterns are similar in nature to those observed in studies that infer strategic behavior related to employee option grants (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Lie, 2005) . Specifically, sales transactions appear to follow systematic run-ups and precede systematic declines. 31 Purchase transactions appear to precede systematic run-ups.
29 Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard (2006) show that insiders' net purchase volume (i.e., purchase minus sales volume) is inversely associated with the probability that a firm will be named as a 10b5 class action suit defendant. 30 Results are similar when firm returns are adjusted for the return to the equally-weighted CRSP portfolio, the equally-weighted Nasdaq portfolio, and the equally-weighted S&P 500 firm portfolio. 31 The sales CAR pattern differs markedly from the general insider sales CAR pattern presented in Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) where BHRw is the trade's w-month buy and hold return, VWBHRw is the w-month buy and hold return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, and w is a subscript for the one-, three-, or six-month returns horizon, respectively.
34 Table 2 presents a comparison of 10b5-1 participants' sales-and purchase-related MktAdjBHRet to
MktAdjBHRet generated by nonparticipants from the same firm. Comparing participants' returns to nonparticipants' returns during a similar period provides some control for firm-, industry-, and macrolevel variables that may otherwise influence participants' trade returns. sales. On average, both participants and nonparticipants observe statistically positive price movement before sales trades execute. Panel A also reports one-, three-, and six-month horizon buy and hold returns estimates for both groups. For all three returns horizons, the mean MktAdjBHRet is statistically more negative (difference = 0.3%, 1.5%, and 3.3% for one-, three-, and six-month horizons, respectively) for 10b5-1 participants than for nonparticipants from the same firms. This is consistent with the plot in Figure 1 , Panel C that shows that 10b5-1 sales have a greater association than nonparticipating sales with future returns declines. Insider characteristics associated with self-selection into trader groups could influence the MktAdjBHRet results documented in Table 2 . To control for self-selection, MktAdjBHRet is regressed in a second-stage regression that includes a dichotomous partitioning variable for 10b5-1 participation and an Inverse Mills ratio computed from a first stage probit regression that estimates the decision to participate in a 10b5-1 program. 35 Inclusion of the Inverse Mills ratio does not affect the statistically negative association between 10b5-1 participation and MktAdjBHRet computed over all three horizons (results not tabulated).
Alternative Abnormal Returns Estimates
Inferences regarding the association between 10b5-1 participation and returns may be confounded by distributional biases in buy and hold returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) . To mitigate the risk of abnormal returns bias, cross sectional firm month and calendar-time portfolio time series excess returns are estimated to control for factors shown by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) to explain returns.
For the first analysis, the following cross sectional regression is estimated for firm month observations that follow sales or purchase transaction months by one to six months. (Gow et al., 2008; Petersen, 2008) .
Stacked regressions are estimated to provide coefficient difference test statistics across 10b5-1 participant and non-participant samples.
For the second analysis, the following portfolio time series regression is estimated for one to six month post-transaction calendar months in which at least 15 post-trade firm month observations are available to compute a portfolio month return. Table 3 reports results for estimating equations (1) and (2) The estimated excess returns appear substantive when considering that there is little evidence of an association between insiders' sales and subsequent negative firm performance in recent studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005) .
portfolio analyses support evidence of a systematic association between 10b5-1 sales and negative future performance, suggesting that sales within the Rule do not solely reflect uninformed diversification.
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Alternative Hypotheses
At least three alternative hypotheses may, in part, explain the observed association between 10b5-1 sales and subsequent negative abnormal returns. The first hypothesis suggests that a negative association might develop if the market responds negatively to Form 4 disclosure of insiders' sales transactions. The second hypothesis suggests that a negative association might develop if 10b5-1 sales plans include graduated limit orders and "predictable" mean reversion occurs subsequent to fulfillment of the limit orders (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) . The third hypothesis suggests that a negative association might develop if trades execute randomly across general bear market periods.
Market Response to 10b5-1 Sales Disclosure
The market might respond negatively to insiders' sales transactions if the market suspects the transactions indicate insiders' private information or if the market infers insiders have unwound a previously-optimal level of equity incentives. To examine whether the market responds negatively to 10b5-1 sales transactions, the three-day cumulative abnormal return, centered on the Form 4 transaction disclosure date, is estimated for 23,340 sales transaction days executed by 10b5-1 participants between 2001 and 2005. 38 The mean three-day response (raw return minus raw return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio) is 0.21% (t-statistic = 6.80), which does not suggest the market responds negatively, on average, to Form 4 disclosures of 10b5-1 sales.
"Predictable" Mean Reversion Subsequent to Price Run-ups
37 For sensitivity, an additional cross section analysis is estimated using a benchmark return procedure similar to the procedure described in Sen (2008) that is based on Daniel et al. (1997) . Specifically, a monthly benchmark portfolio return, R bin , is computed by sorting firms by market value of equity decile, then book to market ratio quintile, then prior one year momentum return quintile. The average return in each of the 250 sort bins is then used as the benchmark for the post-trade firm month return in the following regression: (R j − R bin ) = a 0 . Excess return estimates and firm and calendar month double cluster adjusted t-statistics are consistent with estimates reported in Table 3 (10b5-1 participant sales a 0 = −0.003, t-statistic = −1.92; non participant sales a 0 = 0.002, tstatistic = 1.78; difference t-statistic = −3.82). 38 Form 4s must be electronically filed within two days of transaction execution. If transaction execution authority has been delegated to a third party (as is the case for some 10b5-1 plans), the third party must notify the insider of trade execution within two days. The Form 4 must then be electronically filed within two days of insider notification.
If typical 10b5-1 sales transactions are executed subject to limit order instructions, then it is possible that the associated subsequent price decline reflects "predictable" mean reversion that "naturally" occurs after a sustained run-up in returns (which, presumably, would trigger the limit order sales). 39 To examine whether the potential exists for "predictable" mean reversion following sustained price increases, post-run-up returns are estimated for non-sample firms that observe a similar onemonth prior price increase between 2001 and 2005, and for sample firms that observe a similar onemonth price prior price increase between 1997 and September 2000 (before Rule 10b5-1 enactment).
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If post-run-up mean reversion is "predictable", then one would expect to observe similar magnitude reversion in the alternative samples. Table 4 presents results for the analysis of "predictable" mean reversion in the alternative samples.
By design, the one-month PriorRet estimate of 2.8% approximates the observed buy and hold performance preceding insiders' 10b5-1 sales (Table 2 ). In contrast to Table 2 results, however, the subsequent AbnRet estimates are not statistically negative for either alternative sample. This casts doubt that one might expect "predictable" mean reversion of the observed magnitude following similar sustained price increases.
Random trade during general bear markets
If the sample analysis window reflects a general bear market period, then it is possible that reported results reflect spurious correlation. To examine this possibility, industry-specific calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) are estimated across the entire sample period, the first and second halves of the sample period, and for each year of the sample period. In all cases, results (untabulated) do not provide evidence of systematic negative abnormal returns within any twodigit industry classification, suggesting that a general bear market does not describe the selected time period.
Trade patterns
39 It is not possible to discern whether 10b5-1 plans share a common structure since there is no mandate to disclose 10b5-1 plan terms. It is possible, however, that a number of plans observed in the sample contain instructions to execute sales subject to meeting limit order thresholds. Several of the few publicly disclosed explicit trading plans delineate graduated limit order sales thresholds, where instructions dictate greater sales volume after meeting higher price thresholds. 40 Results are similar when firms are selected based on similar three-month run-up returns.
The previous analyses indicate that 10b5-1 participants, on average, generate abnormal trade returns from sales transactions, suggesting that there may be strategic trade within the Rule. In this section, 10b5-1 trade patterns are examined to better discern how insiders may generate the documented abnormal returns. Trade volume immediately before earnings announcements is first analyzed to determine whether trades appear to anticipate pending earnings news. The association between specific trades' abnormal returns and the timing of these trades relative to plan initiation is then analyzed to determine whether participants appear to initiate plans with short term private information. The association between 10b5-1 plan initiation and subsequent longer-term news disclosure is then examined to determine whether participants' trades appear to anticipate the pending news. Finally, the association between firm returns and early sales plan termination is examined to discern whether insiders appear to terminate plans to prevent sales at lower prices.
Trade patterns before earnings announcements
Prior research shows that insiders are typically reluctant to trade before pending information releases (e.g., Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Noe, 1999; Jagolinzer and Roulstone, 2007) due to litigation concerns or firm-imposed trade restrictions. If Rule 10b5-1 reduces insiders' litigation risk expectations then insiders might be more inclined to initiate trade before pending information releases.
To examine 10b5-1 trade immediately before earnings announcements, the following Tobit regression is estimated:
where PercVol is the dollar volume of firm equity sold by the insider during the 20-trading-day window preceding a quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the firm's prior quarter market value of equity; Part10b5-1 is a dichotomous variable that equals one if an insider's trades execute within a Rule 10b5-1 plan and is zero otherwise; NegEarnsResp is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm's three day market response to its quarterly earnings announcement (the firm's three day raw return, centered on the Compustat quarterly announcement date, minus the three day raw return to the CRSP Value Weighted portfolio) is negative and is zero otherwise; and i, j, and q, are subscripts denoting insider, firm, and quarter, respectively. If participating insiders tend to sell greater volume before negative earnings news, then the coefficient for Part10b5-1 * NegEarnsResp should be positive. Rogers (1993) . Both panels show that 10b5-1 participants are more apt than nonparticipants to initiate sales and purchases in short windows immediately before earnings announcements. The 0.0118 (tstatistic = 6.91) coefficient estimate for sales transactions suggests that the marginal probability of observing sales trade before earnings increases by 3.2% if the trader participates in Rule 10b5-1.
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Relatedly, the expected increase in trade volume conditional on observing sales trade is 0.129% of market value of equity greater for 10b5-1 participants than for nonparticipants. Collectively, this suggests that the Rule appears to relax litigation constraints to trade in short windows that precede earnings announcements, which are periods that are frequently otherwise restricted from trade (Jeng, 1999; Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon, 2000; Roulstone, 2003; Jagolinzer and Roulstone, 2007) . Table 5 does not show evidence that Rule 10b5-1 participants increase the probability of trade or the magnitude of trade volume before earnings news that the market perceives to be negative. The coefficient estimate for Part10b5-1 * NegEarnsResp is neither statistically positive for sales nor statistically negative for purchases. Therefore, there is no systematic evidence of strategic trade in relation to the sign of the earnings news.
Relative trade timing and abnormal returns
To examine further whether participants plan trade when they have short term private information, 
Rule 10b5-1 plan initiation and subsequent adverse news events
Evidence, to this point, suggests that 10b5-1 abnormal returns are not associated with shorter-term information. To better assess the type of information that might underlie documented returns patterns, 60 plan announcements are randomly drawn from the pool of 8-K and newswire disclosures, to discern whether an association exists between plan initiation and pending longer-term news disclosures. Table   6 delineates the 60 randomly drawn observations, their industry affiliation, and the number of days that transpire between initiation and a subsequent potentially adverse news event. To gauge whether there are subsequent adverse news events, Lexis-Nexis businesswire news summaries are examined for 42 The 10b5-1 announcement surrogates for the actual plan start date when the start date is not disclosed. 43 As noted in Section 2, courts and regulators apply the possession-of-material-information standard regarding legality of trade at the 10b5-1 plan initiation date. Therefore, if a materially profitable trade is observed in close proximity to the plan initiation date, it increases the likelihood that the trade or the plan may be perceived as illegal.
reports of adverse news during the 180-day calendar period that follows plan initiation. For 19 firms (32%), there does not appear to be adverse news within this period, denoted by "n/a" for the number of days. For 41 firms (68%), however, potentially adverse news is identified for which three-day raw and market adjusted returns are computed. 44 Eight of the selected event market adjusted returns are positive, however, many randomly selected plan initiations precede materially negative news. On average, plan initiation precedes adverse news events (that exhibit a mean market adjusted return of −9.9%) by 72.2 days. This suggests that an association between plan initiation and pending adverse news disclosure exists, identifying a potential source for the documented abnormal trade returns.
Price patterns and early plan termination
Another potential source for documented abnormal trade returns patterns may be selective early termination of sales plans in anticipation of positive returns. To examine the association between price patterns and plan terminations, Figure 3 plots the average cumulative abnormal return for a sample of 54 firms, for which there is public disclosure of early sales plan termination. 45 Figure 3 shows a noticeable kink in the cumulative abnormal return at date 0, when sales plans were announced to be terminated early. Prior to termination, returns appear negative. Immediately after termination, returns appear to reverse, beginning a gradual climb upward. 46 An analysis of news disclosures during the 90 days subsequent to early plan termination (untabulated) shows that 46% of the observations precede positive news events. This compares with only 11% (7%) of terminations preceding negative (ambiguous) news events. 47 This pattern is consistent with insiders timing sales plan termination to avoid sales that execute at low price points. 48 It is interesting to note that, for this sample of observed 44 Potentially adverse news, for example, includes lower quarterly earnings guidance, missing earnings expectations, accounting inquiries, and analyst downgrades. 45 There is no requirement to disclose plan terminations, so the sample size of observed terminations is inherently small. 46 Statistically, firms exhibit average raw and market adjusted buy and hold returns of −10.4% and −10.6% over the 30-days preceding termination. After termination, firms' exhibit raw and market adjusted buy and hold returns of 10% and 4.8% over the next six months, which are statistically greater than pre-termination returns (tstatistic = 3.25, 2.74 respectively). 47 Positive news events include disclosures of "best ever" quarterly profit, "first ever" quarterly profit, FDA or Canadian authority drug approval, new listing on a major exchange, and share repurchases. Negative news events include revenue recognition scrutiny and lowered earnings or revenue guidance. Ambiguous news events include senior management resignation or turnover. No discernable news events are identified for 36% of observations. 48 Prices may also increase in response to the termination announcement. If so, however, one would expect to see an immediate price jump subsequent to the announcement rather than the gradual price increase that is observed.
sales plans, the average last observed sales transaction is executed 21 days prior to the termination announcement, which appears to avoid the subsequent returns decline.
V. Conclusions and Future Research
The evidence documented in this study collectively points to some level of general strategic trade by participants in Rule 10b5-1. There is evidence that participants' sales, on average, generate abnormal trade returns, that a substantive proportion of selected 10b5-1 plan initiations are associated with pending adverse news disclosure, and that participants terminate sales plans before positive shifts in firm returns.
It is important to note that evidence described in this study is not necessarily indicative of illegal behavior. Regulators generally consider many factors when determining whether particular trade patterns appear to violate insider trading laws. Perhaps the most important factor is that of materiality, and it is not clear that the patterns and returns described herein are material enough to warrant regulatory concern. The evidence in this study should still provide interesting inferences for those who debate whether insiders should be allowed to earn even small abnormal trade returns (in other words, trade returns that are below legally enforceable materiality thresholds yet are still tangible), and whether insiders should be able to abstain from trade when they have private information (e.g., Fried, 2003) .
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The evidence should also provide some interesting inferences for those who monitor insider trading patterns in an attempt to predict pending firm performance.
This study leaves open the question of how 10b5-1 participants are able to generate abnormal trade returns. There is some evidence that suggests participants terminate plans before price increases, which provides a partial explanation for the association between observed sales and future price declines.
However, abnormal returns could also result if participants plan trade when they possess nonpublic information or if participants alter the timing or content of disclosures once trades have already been planned. Given current disclosure rules, it is not possible to empirically disentangle these potential 49 The argument against allowing insiders to earn any abnormal trade returns is based in information property rights (summarized in Bainbridge, 2001) . For example, in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) , the court ruled that an agent "who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a…fiduciary relationship with another…must account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom."
strategies. Future research might examine this more thoroughly, particularly if new disclosure rules are implemented that provide more detailed data.
There are still some interesting questions to address regarding the market effects of disclosing participation within Rule 10b5-1. The Rule presents one of the few instances where firms provide ex ante information regarding pending insider trades. It might be useful to examine how the market responds to 10b5-1 announcements and to what degree these announcements impact insiders' trade returns. If these announcements reduce insiders' profits, it would be interesting to then examine why firms voluntarily disclose this information when there is no current mandate for this disclosure.
restriction relating to Seller's possession or alleged possession of material nonpublic information about the Issuer or the Stock); or (iii) Morgan Stanley has received notice from the is the monthly value-weighted market average return; SMB is the monthly size factor mimicking return (Fama and French, 1993) ; HML is the monthly book-to-market factor mimicking return (Fama and French, 1993) ; MOM is the monthly momentum factor mimicking return (Carhart, 1997) . ( (Gow et al., 2008; Petersen, 2008 Notes.
(1) Out-of-sample estimation of buy and hold returns after observing price increases. (2) A sample draw pool is identified from all firm-day observations that observe a one-month prior buy and hold abnormal return (PriorRet) of no less than 2.4% and no more than 3.2% percent. A sample of 1,167 firm-day observations is randomly drawn from the sample draw pool to compute cross-sectional averages and t-statistics for AbnRet, which is the buy and hold abnormal trade return during the window. AbnRet is computed as the firm's buy and hold raw return minus the buy and hold return to the CRSP value-weighted index. This procedure is iterated 1,000 times and the average of the 1,000 cross-sectional averages is reported. (Part10b5-1 * NegEarnsResp) ijq + ε ijq , where PercVol is the dollar volume of firm equity sold by the insider during the 20-trading-day window preceding a quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the firm's prior quarter market value of equity; Part10b5-1 is a dichotomous variable that equals one if an insider's trades executed within a Rule 10b5-1 plan and is zero otherwise; NegEarnsResp is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm's three day market response to its quarterly earnings announcement is negative and is zero otherwise; the firm's three day market response is computed as the firm's three day raw return, centered on the Compustat quarterly announcement date, minus the three day raw return to the CRSP Value Weighted portfolio for the same period; and i, j, and q, are subscripts denoting insider, firm, and quarter, respectively. (3) t-statistics are corrected for firm-level clusters (Rogers, 1993) . (4) Trade Sequence is a transaction's timing rank relative to other transactions executed by the insider during the 350 day window subsequent to plan initiation disclosure (e.g., sequence 1, 2, and 3, denote the insider's first, second, and third trades, respectively, subsequent to plan initiation disclosure). 
